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PANEL DISCUSSION
The discussion opened with this question directed to Professor
Michelman by Professor Appleton.
If implicit recognition of minimum welfare rights is at the bottom of
the cases that you analyzed for us [in your article], why wasn't the
Supreme Court more explicit? Why did it keep all this a secret? Why did
the Court go out of its way to deny that it was responding to claims of
constitutional rights?
Professor Michelman (after reviewing some of the cases relevant to his
thesis):
It is not my claim that the judges acted in any explicitly self-conscious
way on a welfare-rights premise, which might be a sufficient answer to the
question. But I think. . . [these cases] indicate how one might claim that
there is a legally operative right-a sort of imperfect right, or inchoate
right-without thrusting the Court into the [totally impossible] position in
which it must order the legislature to create programs.
But the question posed by Professor Appleton is if this is the Court's
problem-and I say that there is some evidence that it is-then why does
it go out of its way to put down the notion of these rights? Why does the
Court tell the legislature "you don't have any obligation to do this; it's
just a question of wise social policy," and then turn around in constitu-
tional litigation and treat the legislature in a way that is totally unintel-
ligible except on the thesis that there is an obligation to do it?
The answer lies in the big trouble we all have, especially we lawyers,
about the idea of negative and positive rights. Negative rights include the
right to be let alone, to plan a family the way you want to, to not take an
oath of public allegiance if you don't want to, and the like. Positive rights
consist of claims against other people that they provide you with the
things that you need. . . . A negative right does not draw on a limited
supply of resources; we can be prevented from interfering with one an-
other to an absolutely limitless degree. But the idea of a positive right to
a minimum level of health maintenance. . . [or] to a minimally adequate
level of education is highly troublesome and problematic; indeed, we do
not want to recognize rights where performance of the duty might itself go
beyond the limits of what a general act of free will or sense of justice
might indicate.
A further difficulty-one that bothers Professor Bork, if I understood
his comments correctly, and might also bother a lot of Supreme Court
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Justices--concerns the inability of judges to enforce an inchoate right. To
say that "there is a right to be fed, and there is a right to be educated, and
there is a right to be sheltered, but if the state repeals its welfare law, there
isn't a darned thing a judge can do about it" raises a prospect that I think
courts find baffling. Part of what's required here is judicial acceptance of
a notion that the. . political institutions of society are under a certain
kind of duty to act according to the conception of legitimacy that seemed
to justify their existence in the first place. Courts can recognize and,
within limits, enforce those duties, but there are circumstances in which
all a judge can do is say, "Well, that duty probably isn't being fulfilled,
but there is nothing I can do about it."
The moderator, Professor Dixon, interjected this question to Professor
Michelman:
The Swedish welfare state operated for approximately thirty-five years
until 1976 when an election forced its leaders out of office. Underlying
that election was not a repudiation of the welfare state so much as a desire
to go slower or cut back a little bit. If Sweden had a constitution of the
sort that you hypothesize now, would there have been a constitutional
inhibition on effectuating the outcome of that election by shrinking wel-
fare programs?
Professor Michelman:
In any polity that purports to be democratic and representative, the
judgment of the best way to proceed at any given moment is a judgment
that in the final analysis, it seems to me, cannot be taken away from polit-
ical organs. But I don't see how that defeats my suggestion that there are
circumstances under which courts can observe what the political organs
have done, and can construe what was done as responsive to a valid claim
of right, in the course of resolving its ambiguities or integrating it with
other constitutional doctrines like procedural due process or irrational
classification. That seems to be the real possibility for which I argue.
Professor Dixon:
The idea, however, is that just as the representation process can go both
ways, the welfare decision can call for more or-sometimes-for less, but
is "less" illegal?
[Vol. 1979:733
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Professor Michelman.
I would like to point out that there is at least one case in our constitu-
tional history in which the Supreme Court overruled a repeal by the very
dramatic form you cited; L e., repeal by popular election. That is the Cal-
ifornia Proposition 14 case, Reftman v. Mulkey.' California had an open-
housing statute that gave prospective purchasers and renters of housing a
legally protected right not to be turned down on grounds of race. The
electorate under California's liberal constitutional amendment system
passed Proposition 14, which declared that every owner of property had a
right to sell or not sell it to whom he or she pleased. The Supreme Court
wrote what can only be called an opaque opinion, which held Proposition
14 unconstitutional.
Subtle constitutional lawyers have tried to produce a lot of theories to
defend that decision. Professor Bork's colleague, Charles Black, came up
with the idea that what was wrong with the decision was that it put an
extra hurdle in the way of people that wanted a fair-housing law. If you
wanted fair housing, you now had to get another constitutional amend-
ment. You couldn't just get it from the legislature ...
There is an additional theory that sometimes has been suggested by
various people, myself included. What if we thought of the equal protec-
tion clause as obligating the California legislature to enact a fair-housing
law? What if it was the kind of obligation that no court could ever en-
force from scratch, because what would a court tell the legislature to en-
act? What would the sanctions be? What would the administrative
structure be? Courts don't do those things, but suppose the legislature in
California had acted, done all the detail work, made all the statutory defi-
nitions, and so forth. A repeal by constitutional amendment then occurs
under circumstances in which all that is apparent is the people's dissatis-
faction with the statute for some reason or another. Suppose further that
the legislature does not go back and try to redo it; the legislature just says,
"Aw, the hell with it," and the Supreme Court responds, "You can't do
that!" This is another theory about Reftman v. Mulkey. Once the legisla-
ture has decided what is the best way to do something, it can't turn
around and say, "Aw, the hell with it."
As for Professor Dixon's hypothetical approach about the repeal, I
would say, "Yes, the lawmakers can repeal it." There are too many things
that they might be doing at the same time. They might be trying to pro-
vide a job program in the state. They might be trying to beef-up the econ-
omy so that a demeaning welfare program wouldn't be needed.
1. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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Certainly, they can repeal it, but I tell the Reitman v. Mulkey story to
open minds to the possibility that there might be occasions when the
Court can say, "No!"
The moderator invited Professor Bork to comment on the Reitman de-
cision from a doctrinal standpoint
Professor Bork.-
I think we might well consider the possibility, which many observers of
the Court have stated is more than a possibility, that there isn't a philo-
sophic underpinning for the Court's opinions. In other words, the Court
is, in fact, voting its social sympathies, voting for particular interest
groups. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., noted that possibility thirty years ago
about what was then the Justice Black wing, and what much later became
the majority wing of the Court. So that is one way to explain Reitman v.
Mulkey. What then was social sympathy now has become an elaborate
system of rights.
I wish the Court would tell us what rights are [in that systemic quag-
mire] before a legislature gets its foot stuck in a right through a statute
that it didn't need to pass in the first place. The Court is engaged in a
kind of guerilla welfare: it can't order anybody to do these things, but if
you do them and the target of opportunity comes by, the Court will re-
make the statute for you-at least to achieve some minimum expenditure
on welfare. It's a very odd function for the Court.
Professor Appleton noted that in the abortion-funding cases, the
Supreme Court refused to extend the earlier announced right to seek an
abortion into a right of an indigent to have the statepayfor it. She asked
Professor Michelman, in regard to his theory of a right to food and to
housing, "How do we get to the next step of the state's having to payfor
these?"
Professor Michelman:
The question whether an interest is guarded by a negative right or a
positive right, or both, may well be answered differently in cases that in-
volve different interests. . . . I don't see why one would have to travel in
all cases from recognition of a negative right to a positive right. . . . The
abortion cases, either in the Roe v. Wade2 negative rights sense or in the
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
[Vol. 1979:733
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss3/6
PANEL DISCUSSION
Maher v. Roe3 positive rights sense, are hard cases and it would be a
mistake to try to tease too much general principle from them. If ever
there was a set of cases in which one would want to follow the Bork prin-
ciple, I'm pretty sure this is the one. . . . You have a positive right that
would carry with it, in principle, the threat not only of emptying every-
body's purse, but of drafting people into active participation in something
that they really can't bear.
A member of the audience asked how the different ranges of coverage
and aid under thefederaly administeredprogram for the aged, blind, and
disabled and the federally funded but state-administered program for de-
pendent children can be reconciled
Professor Michelman.
What I suggested earlier is that there are some instances in which so-
cial-welfare benefits are not made available to some subclass that we
might think of as the natural class of beneficiaries, and the Court finds it
possible to intervene on an equal protection ground of unjustified ine-
quality. Obviously, there is no needs-related justification for not feeding
people who live in unrelated households while feeding necessitous people
in the same economic predicament who live in a more conventional way.
Lack of a needs-related justification would be far less obvious when the
question is that of different benefit-level schemes for different socioeco-
nomic groups.
Professor Bork:
There is a basis for charging inequality, and Professor Michelman's an-
swer is, "Yes, but the Court is not willing to look at all groups in society
and ask what constitutes equality and then subsidize all of them."
It's an impossible question. If you try to constitutionalize the area, you
realize why it would have been better to have extended the equal protec-
tion clause beyond the race issue in the first place, because then you get
into the question of what does equality mean for everybody in the society,
and you can't answer that.
Professor Appleton questioned Professor Levin about how Milliken II,4
3. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
4. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
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which mandated special education programs, fits into her school finance
theory.
Professor Levin:
I think Milliken II does get the Court into deciding what are appropri-
ate educational programs, but only in the context of a remedial decree for
a well-defined constitutional violation .... The question was whether a
remedial decree can be limited simply to the reassignment of pupils to
desegregate a segregated system, or whether the unconstitutional racial
isolation created an impact that requires school systems to provide other
kinds of services to undo its unconstitutional effects. . . . Milliken II was
an abnormal situation in which both plaintiffs and defendant-school
board agreed on the plan they wanted, but would the Court approve it
and get the money out of the state?
I see the decision as going well beyond my own proposal for dealing
with school finance cases-that the state must provide a basic level of
educational services; beyond that requirement, local choice would govern.
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